TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- BIWEEKLY REPORT 20 FEBRUARY-5 MARCH 1993 16TH REPORT

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

REPORT TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

12 MARCH 1993

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

BIWEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA) Period of Report: 20 FEB 1993--5 MAR 1993

1. SUMMARY: During the reporting period, Task Force Russia-Moscow (TFR-M) deployed a team to Tambov to conduct additional archival research and to carry out a humanitarian mission. TFR-M also conducted a series of interviews, including one with Major Amirov, who had long been sought as an interview subject. TFR-M finalized a research agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) archives and continued to exploit the Podolsk Red Army archives--although with more restrictions on access than in the recent past. Task Force Russia-Washington (TFR-W) reinterviewed and videotaped LTC (Retd.) Phillip Corso, who had served on staffs in the Far East during the Korean War then on the NSC. During a lengthy session, LTC Corso restated his early claims regarding the transport of U.S. Korean War POWs to the former Soviet Union. Following this interview, TFR-W deployed a team to the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The trip was noteworthy in that the archives of this Presidential library fully supported LTC Corso's statements as to what the U.S. Government knew or had reason to believe about prisoner transfers during the Eisenhower administration. TFR-W also continued research in the National Archives and pursued the document declassification process in an effort to make a maximum amount of pertinent information available to POW/MIA families through the respective service casualty officers.

UPDATE ON ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS:

A. Access to the Podolsk archives is currently limited to Friday visits. Although useful, the effectiveness is diminished by the lack of direct access to complete files. The present Russian technique is to conduct their own files review and to show TFR-M selected documents. The Podolsk archivists appear earnest in their desire to help out with the research effort, but to date none of the documentation provided by this work regime has been as detailed or as valuable as that obtained two months ago under the informal terms of access.

B. The Russian side has identified two officers who will travel to CILHI in late March for an orientation on U.S. remains recovery and forensic techniques. This visit is in support of the anticipated joint deployment to southern Sakhalin and/or the Southern Kurils (Northern Territories).

C. A TFR-M representative met with Major Valeriy Amlrov-- who the U.S. side had long sought to interview. Currently a resident of Yekaterinburg in Western Siberia, Major Amirov is a reporter/editor of the Ural Military District publication "Uralskiye Voyennie Vesti" ("Urals Military News"). Amirov has a reputation within Russia as a self-made POW/MIA expert and had earlier made several controversial allegations. He claims that previous contacts with non-governmental Western researchers have made him hesitant to speak out on this issue; however, he said that, if he unearths any new information in the course

of his independent research, he will provide it to TFR-M through Commission channels. He also agreed to contact his sources informally and query them as to their willingness to participate in the joint interview process. Amirov noted that he had been contacted previously by the Russian side of the Joint Commission, but that, due to his previous experiences, he was reluctant to work with that body.

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D. TFR-W reinterviewed and videotaped LTC (Retd.) Phillip Corso, who had served in a variety of intelligence and POW- related staff positions in the Far East during the Korean War and who was then transferred to Washington, where he worked on the National Security Council (NSC) staff during the Eisenhower administration. LTC Corso repeated his earlier statements (see TFR Biweekly Report for 13 November 1992) to the effect that the U.S. Government then held substantial evidence to support the belief that U.S. POWs from the Korean War were transferred to the Soviet Union. LTC Corso stressed that there were "heroes" in the Eisenhower administration who fought for the interests of POW/MIAs. Regarding the transfers, his fundamental belief is that they happened; that they were "one-way trips" for the POWs; and that the transfers were part of an overarching Soviet intelligence operation. A transcript of the reinterview is attached as Annex A.

E. The majority of outstanding press releases and advertisements for publication in Russian-language newspapers received approval from the appropriate agencies and the texts were sent to Moscow via commercial courier service. Along with national-level coverage in Russia, the advertisements or press releases are specifically targeted at the Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Ussuriysk areas [Note: General Volkogonov suggested Ussuriysk as an area of potential interest]. All of the texts will appear in advance of the April meeting of the Joint Commission. [Note: One announcement concerning amnesty for possible POW/MIA personnel in Russia, will not be published, pending U.S. Commission discussions in Washington.

F. TFR-W analysts conducted a review of those documents from the "Klaus files" whose declassification had been declined by the CIA or the Department of State. In the judgement of the reviewers, nothing contained in these documents would alter or strengthen the U.S. side's position at the April Commission meeting. TFR-W has now reviewed all pertinent documents from the "Klaus files."

EVENTS, INTERVIEWS, CONTACTS, AND MEETINGS ATTENDED:

A. Representatives of TFR-M deployed to the Tambov region to review the archival holdings on the NKVD Rada camp 188, a major internment site for (primarily) WWII German and other Axis POWs. An internal troops officer, LTC Nikolay V. Zagumennikov, met TFR-M at the Tambov airport and escorted the team to the Tambov Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs (W D) for a meeting with Colonel (Promotable) Vladimir M. Puchnin, head of the Tambov W D. Puchnin said Moscow had not provided him with advance information on the Joint Commission or the purpose of TFR-M's visit to Tambov; nonetheless, he was very supportive and ordered LTC Zagumennikov to support the visit. Captain Vladimir Patrin was then ordered to work with TFR-M full-time for the duration of the visit. Research and results were as follows:

(1) TFR-M met with Yuri A. Dulensky, head of the Tambov regional archive that holds the fond listings for the NKVD prison camp 188 archives. Dulensky said that he had heard a report that there were six or seven American POWs in the camp in 1945, but the source of that report had died in 1992. Dulensky stated that the names of the POWs moved by transport trains are in fond number 3444, however, an earlier review of these lists by archival personnel had not uncovered any American or even Russian names. Dulensky did note that, for "unknown reasons," many records had been destroyed over the years. He offered as examples that 20 files *(delo)* were destroyed in 1960 and 293 more disposed of in 1964. He remarked that any information that survived in Tambov could also be found in the POW records in Moscow at the Russian Central Historico-Documentary Collection Archives. Dulensky stressed that all camp archives had been "cleaned up" through the years by camp administrators fearing retribution for their actions.

(2) The TFR-M team then visited the office of Valery Cherkezov, local head of *Iskatel*, a voluntary organization devoted to determining the fate of Soviet POW/MIAs. Cherkezov mentioned that his organization is working with Germany, France, Luxembourg and other countries to erect national memorials in Tambov. He said that volunteer workers from Western countries do excavation work in Tambov. He personally had been to Germany to do POW research. Cherkezov stated that archival checks in Tambov had revealed only one possible American buried in the area. As previously reported by ITAR-TASS in June, 1992, this individual was Francesco Luigi Di Bartolomeo, whose archival entry reflects birth in America in 1924, the occupation of policeman, and burial on 2 April 1945 in mass grave 22 at Kirsanov, 100 kilometers east of Tambov [Note: There is no record of any service member named Bartolomeo listed as killed or missing from WWII. One possibility is that Bartolomeo was an Italian repatriate who served in the Axis forces]. Cherkezov showed TFR-M a letter to *Iskatel* from a woman in Arizona inquiring as to the possibility that Bartolomeo was her husband, an aviator lost in 1945. Cherkezov claimed that local officials are preventing him from obtaining the Arizona woman's exact address because they are interested in obtaining a reported one million dollar reward for potentially-valid POW information. Cherkezov said he would continue his efforts with Captain Patrin's assistance.

(3) TFR-M, with Captain Patrin, next interviewed Major (Ret.) Fyodor Z. Karasayev, Ulistsa Sovietskaya, D. 165-A, KV.61, Tambov (tel. 0752-35-1242). Karasayev, who had been reported as an aviator working in Laos and North Vietnam in February-March 1962. Karasayev admitted that he was a member of an unidentified unit that consisted of 2-4 planes that transported both cargo and passengers. He stated flatly, however, that he had no knowledge of any Soviet involvement with American POWs-

(4) The team then made a three-hour trip to Dryazgi Station, a settlement approximately 100 miles southwest of Tambov, to pass information regarding her son to Zinaida V. Nekrasova. Mrs. Nekrasova's son had been reported killed in a helicopter incident in Afghanistan in 1987, but she had seen a 1988 picture in the newspaper *Izvestia* of two men under arrest in Buffalo, New York, and felt that one of them might have been her son. TFR-M delivered a letter from the FBI stating that the man in the picture was a well-known local involved in the narcotics trade and not a Russian. Nekrasova was very grateful for the U.S. response, but still believes her son may be alive. She expressed anger at the Soviet government, which never told her the actual circumstances of her son's death. She bases her hope that her son might still be alive on the lightness of the coffin--which she was not permitted to open--and on stories that many Russians reported killed were actually taken prisoner.

(5) Back in Tambov, Andrey Khaziyev of the Tambov Television Studio interviewed the TFR-M team for a later broadcast. TFR-M explained the mission and work of the Joint Commission and appealed to local residents for information.

(6) The team then traveled 100 kilometers east to Kirsanov, the site of a cemetery for POWs who died at NKVD Camp 188 at Rada. The site visit reinforced the information that Bartolomeo is buried in Grave 22 with 8 or 9 other POWs. A small plaque with a numeral--which had to be dug out from under deep snow--marked the gravesite. Local records provided no further information on Bartolomeo or on any of the other prisoners interred with him.

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B. Vladimir I. Korotayev, Deputy Director of the Russian Central Historical Documentary Collection, provided TFR-M with personnel data cards on eleven alleged U.S. POWs from the archive's WWII repatriation file. These cards are being forwarded to TFR-W for analysis. TFR-M and Korotayev also reviewed and worked to finalize a research agreement with the archive and agreed to the temporary loan of computer hardware to assist the Russian archivists in preparing their work in a data base format. In view of the amount of material to be reviewed, both sides agreed to a six-month, rather than a three-month, contract. Korotaev appeared to be open to longer term cooperation as well.

(1) Korotaev also noted that his archive is the repository for the records of the Main Directorate of the NKVD (MGB) for POWs and Internees (GUPVI). He said that he was not yet prepared to initiate a formal research program in these holdings, since, he claims, the documents have not been examined at all

since their receipt in the late 1950's. [Note: These holdings are potentially of significant value, since they are reportedly the security services' counterpart to the Red Army's POW records from WWII and the immediate post-war period. The organization allegedly existed into the 1950's.]

(2) Korotaev responded to two requests for assistance sent to him by TFR-M in January, 1993. The first letter asked for a repatriation files check on Jakob Pekar, a German WWII POW, who was the grandfather of a U.S. citizen. The request had been submitted on the citizen's behalf by Congressman John A. Boehner of Ohio. Korotaev stated that there was no record of a Jakob Pekar in the archive's repatriation files. The second letter, submitted on behalf of the Dutch government, asked for information on four Dutch citizens/soldiers who remained unaccounted for from WWII. Korotaev said his archive had information on one of the four, and that this data had been passed directly to the Dutch embassy. [Note: TFR-M verified this information transfer with the Dutch embassy; Dutch officials then asked TFR-M to ask Korotaev for a complete copy of the Dutch POW's file, as the data provided only indicated that the POW had died in prison. TFR-M will honor this request at the next meeting with Korotaev.

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C. TFR-M met with Colonel-General Vladimir N. Abramov, head of the Russian Vietnam Veterans' Association, to attempt to enlist his help in contacting and interviewing several members of his organization. Abramov agreed to intercede with members of the Association. He showed TFR-M personal photographs from his tour in Vietnam, explaining that many of the best ones had "disappeared"--stolen, in his view, either by the North Vietnamese or the Soviet KGB/GRU. One photograph taken in November 1967 and still in his possession showed a downed U.S. Air Force F-4 with the tail number 10051 clearly visible. [Note: TFR-W is currently researching this aircraft loss incident.]

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D. TFR-M met with Igor V. Lebedev, Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). TFR-M and Lebedev reviewed the revised text of a research agreement then formally signed Russian and English copies. Discussing the issue of direct U.S. access to the MFA archives, Lebedev said he supports the idea in principle, allowing that one TFR-M-sponsored "reader" could work with the MFA on a routine basis. A formal request for access would have to go through channels, however, and the precise limits of cooperation would be defined at that time. [Note: TFR-M feels that, given current workload and projected manning, it will be impossible to provide a permanent or even semi-permanent researcher dedicated to the MFA archives. Should the U.S. side wish to pursue this option, a researcher would have to be dispatched from Washington.]

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4. LETTERS:

A. TFR-M received a letter from Valentin V. Sen'ko (Russia 249021, Kalugskaya Oblast, Sukovsky Rayon, Pos. Belousovo, U. Guryanova, Dom. 1-21, Kv. 55) . Sen'ko claims to have encountered two American officers in a camp in which he was an inmate in 1948. He stated that one of the men claimed to be a maj or and gave his name as "Hopkins" or "Gopkins" [Note: This tracks with the well-known story of "Harry Hopkins," a Central European who, while in the GULAG, claimed to be an American officer and took his alias from President Roosevelt's well-known adviser, Harry Hopkins. U.S. agencies tracked "Hopkins" until his repatriation in the 1950's, when he proved to have no claim whatsoever to U.S. citizenship or legal affiliations.] Sen'ko remembered the second officer as a senior lieutenant, but could not recall any name.

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B. TFR-M passed several letters to the Russian side. The first letter requested clarification of the data provided on three U.S. service members from the "510" list which had been passed to Senator Smith in 1992. The second requested General Volkogonov's assistance in scheduling an interview with Lieutenant-

General Leonid V. Shebardin, who had headed the KGB mission to North Vietnam during the early 1960's. General Shebardin is currently an instructor at the Foreign Intelligence Service's (FIS) museum in Moscow. A courtesy copy of this letter was provided to Yuri G. Kobaladze of the FIS Public Affairs and Press Bureau. Finally, TFR-M passed a letter formally inviting the Russian side to send two forensic specialists to CILHI during the week of 22-26 March 1993.

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5. SIGNIFICANT CONUS ACTIVITIES:

A. In addition to those activities highlighted in paragraph 2, TFR-W deployed a research team to the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The library staff were extremely supportive, setting up a work area for TFR-W and steering analysts toward the most lucrative files. TFR-W reviewed all of the pertinent Cold War and Korean War documentation, including extracts from the Eisenhower Papers: Records as President; the Central Files of the Psychological Warfare Strategy Board (PSB) and its successor organization, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB); the papers of Special Assistant to the President C.D. Jackson; the files of the National Security Advisor; phone memos of former Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter; and papers from the White House Central Files: Office of the Staff Secretary. This research provided no dramatic revelations, but did fully confirm LTC (Ret.) Corso's statements as to what the U.S. Government knew or suspected in the post-Korean War period. The documents provide a detailed context about Washington's concern that POWs were taken to China and the USSR, as well as addressing the difficulties of approaching such problems given the fear of general war with the Soviets. A great deal of material addresses U.S. policy in the United Nations and UN confrontations with the USSR and its allies on these issues. The "Rastvorov" debriefing is in this archive and it matches LTC Corso's recollections. TFR-W does not plan a follow-up trip to the Eisenhower Library unless the archival staff unearths new information and documents.

B. TFR-W is analyzing the latest POW list of 99 names provided by the Russians at the December plenary session. This list is entitled: "List: Army Servicemen, USA, located in Korean Captivity, 1951-1953." To date, 65 of the POWs have been identified, of whom 15 are on the American Battlefield Monuments (ABM) list of 8177 names. These 15 are listed in other files as Died in Enemy Hands (DIEH). None of them are truly missing in the sense that there was no knowledge of their fates. Their appearance on the ABM list means that their bodies were not returned. The source of this new list appears to be a press clipping file on POWs. Each entry has a file source, most of which are open-source press articles, mostly Communist publications, such as *Pravda* and *The Daily Worker*, however, a notable non-Communist source cited is *Stars and Stripes.*

C. TFR-W also began to review the archival collection, "Records Seized by U.S. Military Forces in Korea." This collection consists of over 2400 boxes of documents; however, the nature of the collection will require dedicated analysts to isolate any material of value. Although the material is in ten different languages (the majority are in Korean and Russian), the vast majority of the collection consists of library material, such as novels, picture magazines, and newspapers, or of enemy personnel records not of interest to TFR. A review of this collection is underway. DIA Korean linguists are supporting this effort.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. TFR-M should focus its efforts between now and the April meeting primarily on developing information on Korean War-era and Cold War shootdown issues.

B. The Commission should pursue the need to expand our access to the Podolsk archive.

C. TFR-M should develop its ties with Major Amirov with the objective of obtaining possible leads to other Russian citizens who might assist us in our efforts.

ANNEX A TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT, 20 FEB - 5 MAR 1993

TFR INTERVIEW WITH LTC PHILLIP CORSO (USA Ret.) (25 FEB 1993)

QUESTION: Colonel Corso, can you tell us what your role was in the Korean war?

ANSWER: Yes, I was chief of what we called the Special Projects Branch of a Far East Command, G-2 Intelligence Division and that job entailed, in addition to many other duties, like targeting, and so forth, it entailed that I watch, that I keep track of all prisoner of war camps, our prisoners, how they were being treated and where they were, and who was in charge and how they were being interrogated and so forth. That was actually my duty and I was head of the division at MacArthur's headquarters.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what you discovered was the Soviet connection with our POWs?

ANSWER: Well, the Soviets really started in control in the Korean war. Through Russian officers of Korean ethnic origin, most of them were colonels, but when they joined the Korean Army they were either Major Generals or Lieutenant Generals. One of these Soviet officers was named Kyumino. He was in charge of interrogations and the treatment of our prisoners. In addition, actual Soviet officers were present. General Vasilev was the one who gave the order to cross the 38th parallel. I had that on actual words of prisoners of war who heard him give the order. And we had them as prisoners, two of them, two majors, and later he went to the UN. But the Soviets, even when the Chinese were in, Soviets still ran the interrogation and the methods, the Pavlovian methods of eliciting information from prisoners and treatment of our prisoners. It was a Pavlovian type treatment.

QUESTION: Did Soviets, to your knowledge, transport American POWs to the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: Yes, I had definite information of train loads, two certain, possibly three. Each train held 450 prisoners. These prisoners were taken from North Korea through Mukden, Manchuria to Manchouly. Manchouly is on the border of Manchuria and Russia where the gauge changes. That meant that prisoners would be transferred from one train to the other over a landing and that was the point where most of the prisoners were seen and recognized as Americans and they were heading to the Soviet Union over the border in a Soviet train whose gauge was different than the Chinese train. I secured this information from, I'd say, hundreds of prisoner of war reports, from Chinese and North Koreans, who actually saw these prisoners being transported and talked to some of them. Also, we had guerrillas and agents in the area who saw these prisoners being transported and later I talked to a few high level Soviet defectors who confirmed it - that this transfer was going on, which was in violation of what rules the war was supposed to be fought under - if there were any rules. And they were taken to the Soviet Union. We estimated they were taken there for intelligence purposes. The operation, as far as we were concerned, was a GRU/NKVD operation in those days. And it was mostly to illicit information from them, possibly take over their identities or use them as agents, or use those as nationals to assume their identity. And we had information along this line that this was being done. This is normal in many intelligence functions that things like this happen, only the Soviets had perfected the system and it was very sophisticated in the way that they operated. Also, we had information that once the information was taken from them, and they were used, how the Soviets saw fit to use them, they were eliminated, and they would never come back. Which actually happened - they never came back. They were killed, which was Soviet policy also.

QUESTION: What was the source of this information?

ANSWER: The source of this information, as I said, was hundreds of prisoner reports, North Korean and Chinese prisoners that we took, defectors and other intelligence that I can't describe for certain reasons. And, as I say, photographs, because we photographed camps, and so we saw movements, and people on the ground, civilians, also would come through. This was the intelligence process, put together very, very carefully, for a long period of time, matching all information and putting them together to show a pattern in the picture.

QUESTION: How closely did the defector information parallel the information from POWs, etc.?

ANSWER: Very close, in fact, what I was seeking from the defectors was the KGB/GRU operation. Not

so much that prisoners were being taken to the Soviet Union, because we already knew that. But I wanted to learn more of the method of operation of the GRU/KGB on how they used these prisoners, because that was the intelligence aspect of this. We knew that some were being used for espionage and maybe some for sabotage and we wanted to know what we could find out. So, mostly, my information on numbers and the transfer of prisoners was not taken from defectors. I didn't need that from defectors - we had that information, but operations within the Soviet Union, and the way they treated and what they did with these prisoners - that was where we were lacking in a lot of our information. And that I tried to get - and I got it - from defectors.

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One thing I didn't think of, which I'll talk about here - I, through information that the Soviets were using, what we called a "War on POW camps", they continued the war even among prisoners of war, because to them it was an all out war. I found out from the head of the camp that was doing a lot of rioting in Southern Korea. I discovered later through interrogations of other means that he was a Soviet officer, a colonel, and a North Korean Lieutenant General, and he confirmed a lot of this information for me and also confirmed that there were thirty-six officers like him who really controlled the North Korean army in addition to Soviet advisors and there were 22,000 Soviet combat troops in Korea besides these Korean officers who were Russians of Korean ethnic origin. That was also a source of information.

QUESTION: I'd like to move now to your service on the National Security Council.

ANSWER: OK, I'll cover that. Now this officer that I uncovered in the prison camp, and we interrogated and we got the information we needed, after the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and we began on Big Switch, the main prisoner body, I prepared the intelligence of many or all of all 500 of our sick and wounded were not given back and died in camps, died from various sicknesses and ailments. So when Big Switch started, at the main exchange, the General found out I had orders to come home and sent me to the United States, since I had been over there since the beginning of the Korean war. When I arrived in the United States, I was called back from leave, specifically at the Pentagon, in the G-2 section, there was a special panel set up to deal with the Soviet officer that I had uncovered which was running the prisoner of war camp and the riots and so forth. And I was called back to the Pentagon for that reason. Immediately after that, orders came from the White House for my assignment to the National Security Council in the White House

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to deal with POWs. I was called to support Ambassador Lawrence of the United Nations on the accusation that we used bacteriological warfare and atrocities presentations which Vyshinski accused us of at the United Nations. So I prepared the intelligence and the speeches on that and Vyshinski walked out on his own resolutions when he heard the contents of these speeches. Immediately after the bacteriological speech, which was the conditioning of prisoners on the Pavlovian theories and so forth. C.D. Jackson, special assistant to the president, issued an order for my permanent assignment to the National Security Council. So I remained there and one of my main duties remained, always, was prisoner of war affairs. Prisoners of war in the Soviet Union, mainly in Soviet or Communist held territories, which was the Soviet Union primary, secondary - China. I had other duties, but these always remained my two main duties as long as I was there.

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I was going to write a speech for the Lodge on the Korean War and what was going on in the Korean War. One of the items was support of the Korean War, logistically. This was especially after I got the captain and the mate of that ship the Topsy, which the Chinese Nationalists captured. That's where I had

orders from Eisenhower to go to the State Department and tell the group not to give it back. So we didn't give it back. So, in the speech at the lodge I wanted to show that the rickety Trans-Siberian railroad and Chinese Railroad could not support their work [may be wharfs]. They had to bring ships up with oil, all the way up - so they were war booty. The Chinese Nationals were at war with them and had the right to grab those ships and so did we, only we didn't have the guts to do it. But they did and the Nationalists captured the ship. So, when I wrote this out and was going into the speech, by the way, I got a hold of this information from the Department of Defense, they did a hell of a good job furnishing me with the information. So, the CIA calls me up and says, "We challenge your information." Oh, you do? Oh, that's good. Ok, I'll tell you what I'll do - I'll hold a conference here at the White House. Send your experts over. Six of them show up. I tell them, "All right gentlemen, let's start with this premise - don't pull source on me. I know better - save that for Congress and people who don't know any better. If I suspect that you have a source, which you don't, then I'll tell you the name. I'm on the Security Council and you don't want to keep it from me." Number two - I tell them, "Don't pull national security on me, because I'll make you name national security as your defendant you're trying to cover. I'll ask you questions on it. So let's rule these two out. The third one - don't quote top secret on me to cover your ass. I don't go for that. So, these are the three premises. Let's forget those - don't even talk about them. Now go ahead - here's my evidence, where's yours?" The conference broke up. They didn't have any evidence, they were going to pull the old bullshit of national security source and stuff on me. But they don't give up. In three or four days I get a call, "This is a joint British/American estimate, but that's not true what you were saying." Good - bring the damned Limeys with you. But they never showed up. No one ever showed up. It went in Lawrence's speech. Vyshinski walks out because we showed him that they weren't able to supply their armies for attacks which lasted ten days, they were down toward the end of the war only two days into the attack. They didn't have any supplies. We had bled them white. We won that war. They stopped us back here from destroying the Chinese army. So, logistically, we won the war. They couldn't fight us anymore. So what happened - the policy makers very conveniently said, "In the interest of peace because of Korea's inconclusive operation let's begin talks on the peace at Pan men Jan and the peace treaty. That was policy - they wrote it in policy. So, that was the story on logistics. They tried to stop me.